Paranoia as an Antecedent and Consequence of Getting Ahead in Organizations: Time-Lagged Effects Between Paranoid Cognitions, Self-Monitoring, and Changes in Span of Control by Niels Van Quaquebeke
fpsyg-07-01446 September 20, 2016 Time: 13:22 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 22 September 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01446
Edited by:
Con Stough,
Swinburne University of Technology,
Australia
Reviewed by:
Robert Jason Emmerling,
ESADE Business School, Spain
Jean-Luc Bernaud,
Conservatoire National des Arts et
Métiers, France
Simon George Taukeni,
University of Fort Hare, South Africa
*Correspondence:
Niels Van Quaquebeke
niels.quaquebeke@the-klu.org
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Organizational Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 03 July 2016
Accepted: 08 September 2016
Published: 22 September 2016
Citation:
Van Quaquebeke N (2016) Paranoia
as an Antecedent and Consequence
of Getting Ahead in Organizations:
Time-Lagged Effects Between
Paranoid Cognitions, Self-Monitoring,
and Changes in Span of Control.
Front. Psychol. 7:1446.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01446
Paranoia as an Antecedent and
Consequence of Getting Ahead in
Organizations: Time-Lagged Effects
Between Paranoid Cognitions,
Self-Monitoring, and Changes in
Span of Control
Niels Van Quaquebeke*
Management, Kühne Logistics University, Hamburg, Germany
A 6-month, time-lagged online survey among 441 employees in diverse industries
was conducted to investigate the role paranoia plays as an antecedent and as
a consequence of advancement in organizations. The background of the study is
the argument that it requires active social sense-making and behavioral adaptability
to advance in organizations. The present paper thus explores the extent to which
employees’ paranoid cognitions—representative of a heightened albeit suspicious
sense-making and behavioral adaptability—link with their advancement in organizations
(operationalized as changes in afforded span of control), both as an antecedent
and an outcome. Following the strategy to illuminate the process by interaction
analysis, both conditions (antecedent and outcome) are examined in interaction
with employees’ self-monitoring, which is considered representative of a heightened
but healthy sense-making and behavioral adaptability. Results support the expected
interference interaction between paranoid cognitions and self-monitoring in that each
can to some degree compensate for the other in explaining employees’ organizational
advancement. Reversely, changes in span of control also affected paranoid cognitions.
In particular, low self-monitors, i.e., those low in adaptive sense-making, reacted with
heightened paranoid cognitions when demoted. In effect, the present study is thus the
first to empirically support that paranoid cognitions can be a consequence but also
a prerequisite for getting ahead in organizations. Practical advice should, however, be
suspended until it is better understood whether and under what circumstances paranoia
may relate not only to personally getting ahead but also to an increased effectiveness
for the benefit of the organization.
Keywords: paranoia, self-monitoring, getting ahead, span of control, zero-inflated negative binomial regression,
cognitions, management, career
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INTRODUCTION
While the study of leadership effectiveness is undoubtedly
important for understanding what gets organizations ahead, it
is the study of leadership emergence1 that often strikes closer
to home because it explains what type of people get ahead. It
resonates with our romantic attachment to leaders (Meindl et al.,
1985) and provides fuel to those wanting to become leaders
themselves. Despite prevalent enchantment with becoming a
leader, promotions to leadership positions might, however, also
come at a price. Anecdotes describe how social dynamics can
dramatically change for people once they are promoted to lead
others (Sennett, 2000; Kramer, 2001).
In the present paper, I seek to shed light on both issues.
Specifically, building on Kenny’s and Zaccaro’s (1983) account
of leader social sensitivity and flexibility as prerequisites
for leadership emergence and Kramer’s (2001) analysis of
organizational paranoia, I will focus on paranoia as an antecedent
but also as a consequence of span of control. Paranoia has
a rich clinical psychological tradition (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000), yet to this date remains largely uninvestigated
with regard to the issue of leadership (an exception is the
theoretical account of Kramer and Gavrieli, 2004). Interestingly,
though, in its symptomatic expression paranoia resembles self-
monitoring, a trait that has already been closely linked with
the issue of leadership emergence (Day et al., 2002). Given the
resemblance of both concepts, I will explore both in concert to
elucidate more of the underlying social additivity and sensitivity
mechanism.
In sum, the current study seeks to investigate whether
paranoia is not only adaptive for getting ahead in organization
but also whether it may be the result of promotion and demotion
processes (as evidenced in changes in afforded span of control).
It thereby complements the rather popular literature with
empirically driven insights (e.g., Grove, 1997; Babiak and Hare,
2007; Collins and Hansen, 2011; Ghaemi, 2011) and extends
the available scientific literature on psychopathologies at work
(cf. Judge et al., 2009; O’Boyle et al., 2012) with the soundly
established clinical psychological concept of paranoia. As such,
the present study is to my knowledge the first to empirically
explore the “darker” path to and from leadership via the concept
of paranoia. The present study, additionally, adds to the debate on
what is state and what is trait. In particular, by looking at paranoid
cognitions not only as an antecedent but also as an outcome
of changes in afforded span of control, the study design follows
Zaccaro’s (2007) call to investigate if and to what degree manager
dispositions are malleable due to situational circumstances. This
approach mirrors advances in fundamental psychology that argue
that the trait/state divide may not be as clear cut as once believed
(Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Fleeson, 2001; Mischel, 2004; Hudson
et al., 2012) – an insight that has by and large not permeated
the organizational literature so far. Third, the present research
also follows another one of Zaccaro’s (2007) calls for future trait
1Note that I follow a recent differentiation of the various types of leadership
measures by Kaiser et al. (2008) in which selection for a leadership role and
respective promotions that include increases in span of control are categorized
under “leadership emergence.”
research, namely to consider meaningful patterns and integration
of multiple attributes. Against this background, specifically
looking at self-monitoring as a moderator of paranoia permits a
more in-depth interpretation of the explanatory dynamics at play
in light of hard-to-assess mediators (Spencer et al., 2005; Jacoby
and Sassenberg, 2011).
In the following, I will separately delineate paranoia as an
antecedent and as an outcome of span of control. Respective
results will also be depicted and interpreted separately but then
tied together in a discussion.
Why Paranoia and Self-monitoring
Support Getting Ahead
The conventional account argues that people’s social sense-
making and adaptivity are prerequisites for career advancement
because those abilities allow respective individuals to effectively
navigate the political sphere of organizations (Foti and
Hauenstein, 1998; e.g., Kenny and Zaccaro, 1983; Zaccaro
et al., 1991; Turnley and Bolino, 2001; Yukl and Mahsud, 2010).
In the following, I will first outline how self-monitoring feeds
into this social sense-making and additivity, to then argue that
the same dynamics also hold for paranoia, and, as such, both can
be assumed to substitute for each other in their effect on getting
ahead in organizations.
Self-monitoring is a trait that has been extensively studied
in the organizational domain, specifically with regard to
its potency for getting ahead in organizations (Day et al.,
2002). Self-monitoring is defined as a consistent pattern of
individual differences in the extent to which people regulate
their self-presentation by tailoring their actions in accordance
with immediate situational cues (Snyder, 1974; Lennox and
Wolfe, 1984). The ability of high self-monitors to observe and
control their appearance in social settings and interpersonal
relationships is seen as an interpersonal competitive advantage in
organizations, especially when it comes to career progress (for an
overview see: Day et al., 2002; Day and Schleicher, 2006); with the
meta-analysis of Day et al. (2002) showing a corrected correlation
of 0.21 between self-monitoring and leadership emergence (in its
various operationalizations, cf. Kaiser et al., 2008). The argument
in a nutshell is that organizations are complex arena of social
relations. Hence, those who want to advance need to be able
to competently and confidently maneuver in this arena. High
self-monitors are not only sensitive to the social cues around
them, but also capable to adaptively move on the social parquet,
and hence they advance more easily than low self-monitors. Yet,
very similar arguments might also be put forward for a slightly
“darker” construct: paranoia.
Paranoia has a rich tradition in clinical psychology (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000), but to this date has largely been
omitted from micro organizational research (an exception is
the theoretical account of Kramer and Gavrieli, 2004). Paranoia
is defined as a mental state characterized by a pervasive,
long-standing suspiciousness and generalized mistrust of others
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). When diagnosed as a
stand-alone personality disorder, the WHO’s ICD-10 (1993) lists
(1) excessive sensitivity to setback and rebuffs, (2) tendency to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1446
fpsyg-07-01446 September 20, 2016 Time: 13:22 # 3
Van Quaquebeke Paranoia and Getting Ahead
bear grudges persistently, (3) a combative and tenacious sense
of personal rights, (4) tendency to experience excessive self-
importance, and (5) recurrent suspicions without justification
regarding sexual fidelity of spouse of sexual partner, (6)
suspiciousness and a pervasive tendency to distort experience by
misconstruing the neutral or friendly action of others as hostile
or contemptuous and (7) preoccupation with unsubstantiated
“conspiratorial” explanations of events both immediate to the
patient and the world at large. For a clinical diagnosis of a full
paranoid personality disorder, three of these symptoms need to
be present.
Paranoia, however, can also show in a milder and more
malleable form as ‘paranoid delusions’. Content-wise
corresponding ideations often relate to point 5 and 6 in the
personality disorder. Thus also called persecutory delusions
(Freeman, 2007). Importantly, such paranoid thoughts are not
all that uncommon in the regular population (10–15% according
to Freeman, 2007; more than 25% according to Verdoux and van
Os, 2002) and they are not necessarily considered pathological.
Affected individuals are oversensitive, easily feel slighted, and
vigilantly scan the environment for clues or suggestions that
may confirm their fears or preconceptions. Indeed, paranoid
individuals are eager, however, somewhat irrational observers
(Freeman et al., 2012). They think they are in danger and look
for signs and threats of that danger. The person’s subsequent
paranoid cognitions often revolve around a concern for how
others might observe or try to harm him or her (Freeman et al.,
2005). As a consequence, affected individuals are always on high
alert and try to maneuver in what they consider a ‘smart’ way to
evade or even counter the impeding attack (Fein, 1996; de Vries,
2006).
With this in mind, the argument made for self-monitoring
can also be made for paranoia. Paranoid individuals also
constantly scan their social environment and control and adapt
their behavior toward others – albeit for different reasons
than high self-monitors (Kramer, 1994). Whereas high self-
monitors feel confident that they can read the social environment
and proactively respond to it, paranoid individuals often feel
helpless in social contexts and hence devise defensive strategies
to cope with the uncertainty. Both strategies are social sense-
making strategies. High self-monitors try to understand the social
environment to build relationships (Kilduff et al., 2001), paranoid
individuals try to understand the social environment in order not
to become the target of anyone. As Kramer and Gavrieli (2004,
pp. 251–252) put it “In acute sensemaking predicaments, where
the costs of misguided action may be catastrophic to a leader,
more effortful and mindful modes of information processing
may be enormously useful. Thus, precisely because leaders are so
willing to allocate cognitive resources to sensemaking tasks, they
might be more likely to detect early and formulate response to
threats that others underestimate or overlook.”
As both constructs, paranoid cognitions and self-monitoring,
evoke social sense making and adaptability which has been
argued to be a central prerequisite for career advancement (Foti
and Hauenstein, 1998; e.g., Kenny and Zaccaro, 1983; Zaccaro
et al., 1991; Turnley and Bolino, 2001; Yukl and Mahsud, 2010),
and the link between self-monitoring and getting ahead in
organizations has already been meta-analytically confirmed (Day
et al., 2002), the following interaction hypothesis can be put
forward:
Hypothesis 1: Both paranoia and self-monitoring can
compensate for the lack of the other in their effect on getting
ahead in organizations.
Why and When Getting Ahead May
Inform Paranoia
Following Kramer’s (2001) account of organizational paranoia,
the second objective of the present paper is to investigate
whether changes in span of control also affect people’s paranoid
cognitions. Indeed, social dynamics change once people are
promoted to lead others or demoted to lead fewer. For example,
being awarded more span of control often would be understood
as a sign of afforded trust, while losing span of control may
prompt respective individuals to think that others are out
to sabotage them and, as a demotion suggests, have already
partly succeeded (Kramer, 1996, 1998). Because any significant
organizational process will be met with a sense-making process
(Jaques, 1953; Weick, 1995), both kinds of incidents will spur
sense-making questions in individuals trying to answer why this
has happened to them (Diamond et al., 2004).
Given people’s propensity for self-serving biases and
protecting their self-esteem (Baumeister, 1998), promoted
individuals will likely recognize their promoters’ goodwill and
see the reason for their promotion within themselves. In contrast,
demoted individuals likely identify external parties as the cause
for personal ‘failure’ experiences. Fiske et al. (1996, p. 116)
argue furthermore that being subjected to such potentially
ill-willed external control, such as in the case of a demotion, will
“make powerless people anxious by threatening basic motives
for competence, control, and self-esteem.” Additional recent
physiologically grounded research supports this view by showing
that cortisol (an indicator of anxiety) is positively related to not
feeling in control (Sherman et al., 2012). So it is in particular a
demotion that may prompt paranoid thought while a promotion
may reduce it.
Yet, again, promotions and demotions are organizational
dynamics that call for social sense-making. In this respect,
self-monitoring may once again exhibit a moderating effect by
guiding respective individuals to more sensible and potentially
less sinister inferences (Ferris et al., 2007). This follows studies
that have, for instance, found that higher self-monitoring goes
hand-in-hand with decreased social anxiety (Lennox and Wolfe,
1984, r = −0.18) and produces a significantly lower tendency
to engage in social comparison (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999,
r =−0.23). As such, high self-monitoring may be able to provide
a (sensemaking) buffer against negative situations and thus
resultant anxiety. In sum this would mean, that an individual’s
cognitive downward spiral into paranoid thought as a result
of a demotion may be buffered by that individual’s high self-
monitoring ability. With this understanding, a second interaction
hypothesis can be formulated:
Hypothesis 2: Decreases in span of control are positively related
to changes in paranoid cognitions, and this effect is stronger for low
self-monitors than for high self-monitors.
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MATERIALS AND METHOD
Sample
Participants were recruited as part of a large clinical study
in Germany that was investigating the relationship between
paranoid cognitions in the general population and respective
decision and safety behavior in two cross-sectional designs
(reference omitted to ensure review blindness). The present study
used only participants that volunteered information at both time
points and could be matched for its cross-lagged analyses (see
sample description below).
Invitations were sent out to all available working panelists
in the WiSo online panel. The panel was set up with help
of considerable third party Government funds. It is dedicated
exclusively to academic research. Participants can fill out
the respective questionnaires online whenever convenient for
them, i.e., at home or at work. For their participation,
participants received bonus points within the online panel
system that they could later exchange for products that would
be sending to them. As such, the WiSo panel is very similar
to the US panel Amazon mTurk for which studies attest the
psychometric quality (e.g., Paolacci et al., 2010; Buhrmester
et al., 2011) putting such means of data collection at least
on par with regular surveys (Gosling et al., 2004). To be
able to answer the directionality implied in both hypotheses,
all measures were collected at two time points 6 months
apart.
Analyses were conducted across 441 time-matched
participants that were considered sound. Data from individuals
who, without a single exception, crossed items consistently
at either the lowest or highest possible point on all scales at
both times, T1 and T2, were excluded due to their suspicious
answering behavior (cf. Meade and Craig, 2012). Furthermore,
because the Global Fortune500 ranking identifies the Deutsche
Post as Germany’s biggest employer (in 2011, worldwide 13th)
with 418,000 employees, an additional 10 participants were
excluded who indicated that their current organization size is
above that number.
The sample’s mean age was 41 years (SD = 11.86) with
women representing 55.21% of the sample. Of all participants,
42.28% had a university degree and 64.47% had completed
an (additional) apprenticeship. Individuals came from a wide
variety of industry sectors such as production, finance, or
educational institutions as well as a wide variety of departments
such as sales, customer service, or research and development.
Following the reasoning that paranoid cognitions should help
in improving span of control and not necessarily with getting
or losing a job, participants were included if they had a
job at T1 and T2. However, even if the criterion involved
having a job either at T1 or T2, possibly due to the reasoning
that paranoid individuals might obtain but also lose their
(leadership) job faster, the ultimate sample size would increase
by 32, but results would not fundamentally change. Further,
because the objective of the present research is to reveal
changes in span of control, people remained in the sample
irrespective of whether they were actually leading other people
at T1 or T2.
Measures
Self-monitoring was assessed at T1 with the 11-item revised self-
monitoring scale by Lennox and Wolfe (1984). Sample items
include “In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior
if I feel that something else is called for” and “If someone is
lying to me, I usually know it at once from the person’s manner
of expression.” Answers were made on a five-point Likert scale
ranging from “fully disagree” to “fully agree.”
Paranoia was assessed via paranoid cognitions at T1 and
T2 with the 18-item Paranoia Checklist (Freeman et al., 2005),
which has been deemed appropriate when testing for paranoia
symptoms in non-clinical samples (e.g., “There might be negative
comments being circulated about me.”; “People would harm me
if given an opportunity.”). Answers were made on a five-point
Likert scale featuring the choices: “almost never,” “monthly,”
“weekly,” “several times a week” and “daily.”
Getting ahead was measured via changes in afforded span of
control. To this end, span of control was assessed at T1 and T2 by
asking participants about how many people in their organization
are considered their subordinates (directly and indirectly). Zero
was the default for no span of control.
Next to gender and age, which have been shown to correlate
with self-monitoring (Day et al., 2002), two additional variables
were assessed as controls at T1 because of their potential link
with the outcome: (1) highest education degree because it often
marks an entry requirement for leadership positions, and (2)
organization size because it might be easier to obtain a leadership
position when there are more opportunities to lead people.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the descriptives, intercorrelations, and
psychometric properties of the scales involved. Expectedly,
paranoid cognitions covary (r = 0.6). The degree of covariation
suggests around 36% stability over time. Remaining unexplained
variance allows for the second analysis in which paranoid
cognitions are investigated as an outcome of changes in span
of control. The covariation of span of control at T1 and T2
indicates 80% stability over the 6-month time frame. However,
much of the stability is due to the fact that many respondents
who did not have span of control at T1 also did not have any at
T2. Such a high amount of zeros needs be taken into account
when deciding upon the appropriate analysis method – as will be
explained in the section hereafter. With that said, some changes
did occur: 11% saw an increase in span of control and 13% saw a
decrease in span of control. Collectively, this led to a slight drop
in the mean span of control from T1 to T2, which is also visible
in the difference score that will be used for the second part of
the subsequent analysis. The similarity of means and standard
deviations of constructs that were measured at T1 and T2 bolsters
confidence in the quality of the sample as big deviations could be
taken a sign of survey faking (Moritz et al., 2012).
In the following, I will describe the two analyses separately,
i.e., (a) paranoid cognitions as an antecedent of span of control
changes and (b) as a consequence of changes in span in
control. Because the to be predicted outcomes are of different
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TABLE 1 | Descriptives, intercorrelations, and internal reliabilities.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(1) Gender 1.46 0.50 (na)
(2) Age 41.00 11.90 0.11∗ (na)
(3) Education 5.04 1.84 0.01 −0.12∗∗ (na)
(4) Organization size 7011 33548 −0.04 −0.05 0.03 (na)
(5) Paranoid Cognitions T1 1.74 0.73 0.12∗ −0.10∗ −0.16∗∗∗ 0.05 (0.95)
(6) Paranoid Cognitions T2 1.71 0.73 0.10∗ −0.09 −0.12∗ 0.06 0.60∗∗∗ (0.95)
(7) Self-monitoring T1 3.47 0.54 −0.06 0.10∗ 0.02 0.01 −0.07 −0.05 (0.83)
(8) Span of control T1 11.83 76.89 0.01 0.04 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 0.10∗ (na)
(9) Span of control T2 9.70 67.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 −0.01 −0.03 0.02 0.10∗ 0.90∗∗∗ (na)
(10) Change in Span of
Control from T1 to T2
−2.13 34.12 −0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 −0.01 0.03 −0.04 −0.49∗∗∗ −0.06
N = 441, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; Gender: 1 = female, 2 = male; two-sided; Cronbach’s alpha in brackets in the diagonal where applicable.
psychometric type, also different kinds of regression analysis need
to be employed.
Analysis of Paranoia and Self-Monitoring
as Antecedents of Getting Ahead
Because the dependent variable, span of control change, is a
count variable, Poisson type of regressions are advised (Gardner
et al., 1995). In case of over-dispersed count data, the method
of choice is a negative binomial regression as it overcomes the
highly restrictive boundary conditions for Poisson regressions. In
the present case concerning span of control, the variable is not
only over-dispersed, but zeros (i.e., no span of control either at
T1 or T2) comprise around one-third of the entries. More recent
advances in statistics are able to adjust for such distributions by
modeling a zero-inflation (Long, 1997). The zero-inflation model
generates a second model that will be fitted simultaneously to the
specified regression model to account for excess zeros so that they
do not distort the regression.
Statistical tests are available to ascertain the statistical path
to take (Long and Freese, 2006). For instance, in the present
case, a likelihood-ratio test of the natural log of the over-
dispersion coefficient returns an alpha of 1.73 (robust SE of
0.232; untransformed coefficient is 5.627 with a robust SE of
1.307), which is significantly different from 0 (χ2 = 2538.35,
p < 0.001); this confirms that a zero-inflated negative binomial
model is preferred over an ordinary zero-inflated Poisson-model.
Additionally, the Vuong-test (z = 1.70, p = 0.049) confirms that
the zero-inflated negative binomial is preferred over an ordinary
negative binomial regression model. Finally, robust regression
can be applied to adjust for heterogeneity in the data. Hence, for
the present data analysis a robust zero-inflated negative binomial
regression is employed and computed with STATA. Due to the
inherent count nature of the dependent variable, the ensuing
analysis follows a logarithmic function, meaning that y-axis unit
increases per x-unit are log increases thus requiring slightly
different plotting of figures and slopes analysis.
The above entails that two models have to be considered:
(1) a model predicting the change in span of control and (2)
a model predicting the excessive zeroes in span of control.
With regard to the first model: Negative binomial regressions
cannot handle negative dependent variables. Thus instead of
simply taking a difference score between T2 and T1 in span
of control to assess change, the analysis predicts T2 while
controlling for the effect of T1, thus essentially also predicting
change between T2 and T1 through the other predictor variables
in the model (Edwards, 2001). With regard to the second
model: The assumption inherent in zero-inflated modeling is
that a separate process creates the excessive zeros. For the
present analysis, the above-described control variables were
thus inserted not only in the count model but also in the
inflate model. That is gender, age, education, or size of the
organization could be related to not having any span of control
at all. In line with good statistical practice, both models
retained the control variables only if they had a significant
impact and if the overall model fit saw improvement (Becker,
2005).
The best-fitting model identified participants’ self-monitoring,
paranoia and their interaction in the count model, with
participants’ highest educational degree and gender showing
as predictors in the zero-inflation model (Wald-χ2 = 18.88,
p < 0.001). Other potential control variables (organizational
size and participant age) did not contribute significantly in the
count or the zero-inflation model, nor did they interact with
the focal predictors; these variables were thus omitted. The final
models are shown underneath each other in Table 2. Please
note that according with good statistical practice predictors were
standardized before entering them and their interaction term
(Cohen et al., 2003). The non-significant main effect between
span of control at T1 and T2 confirms the inflated correlation
in the regular correlation depicted in Table 1 due to the excessive
amount of zeros in the data. As expected, self-monitoring at T1
relates to a logarithmic increase in span of control. As a main
effect, paranoia at T1 shows no effect on change in span of
control. Most importantly, however, the main effects are qualified
by the interaction between self-monitoring and paranoia. The
significant interaction pattern is plotted in Figure 1. As can be
seen, and in line with Hypothesis 1, higher paranoia explains
increases in span of control under the condition of low self-
monitoring [Incident Rate Ratio (IRR) = 1.629, SE = 0.270,
z = 2.94, p = 0.003, ll-CI(95%) = 1.176, ul-CI(95%) = 2.256], but
not under the condition of high self-monitoring (IRR = 1.200,
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TABLE 2 | A zero-inflated negative binomial regression to explain (a) the count variable changes span of control (span of control at T2 while controlling
for span of control at T1) and (b) the excessive amount of zeros in the count variable.
B SE (robust) z p ll-CI ul-CI
Count model Constant 0.988 0.565 2.12 0.034 0.076 1.900
Span of control T1 0.026 0.019 1.40 0.161 0.010 0.063
Self-monitoring T1 (SM) 0.335 0.127 2.65 0.008 0.087 0.583
Paranoid Cognitions T1 (P) 0.126 0.095 1.33 0.183 −0.060 0.312
Interaction (SM∗P) −0.153 0.072 −2.11 0.035 −0.295 −0.011
Inflate model Constant 4.240 1.162 3.65 0.000 1.962 6.519
Education −0.408 0.152 −2.69 0.007 −0.706 −0.110
Gender −2.261 1.016 −2.22 0.026 −4.253 −0.027
N = 441, lower (ll) and upper (ul) level for Confidence Intervals (CI) at 95%.
FIGURE 1 | The interactive effects of paranoid cognitions and
self-monitoring on changes in span of control.
SE = 0.146, z = 1.49, p = 0.135, ll-CI(95%) = 0.945, ul-
CI(95%) = 1.524). In other words, paranoia and self-monitoring
can compensate for the lack of the other in explaining increases
in span of control.
Besides the focal count model, the additional zero-inflation
model shows the significance of the participants’ highest
education degree and their gender with regard to having no span
of control. Corresponding with standard hiring and promotion
procedures in organization, lower educational degrees expectedly
go hand-in-hand with a lower chance of receiving a leadership
position. Additionally, and as role congruity theory elucidates
(Eagly and Karau, 2002), females have a lower likelihood of
obtaining any leadership position at all.
Analysis of Paranoia as a Consequence
of Getting Ahead and Self-Monitoring
When analyzing the effects of changes in paranoid cognitions on
changes in span of control in interaction with self-monitoring,
a regular OLS regression is the appropriate course of analysis.
Also, because of its count nature, it is now fitting to operationalize
change span of control as the difference between span of control
at T1 and T2 (Edwards, 2001) and entering the difference as an
independent variable in the model. Note that change in paranoia
(similar as change in span of control in the previous analysis)
is captured by controlling for paranoia at T1 while explaining
paranoia at T2.
Respective results are displayed in Table 3. While none of the
predictors beyond paranoia at T1 has a significant main effect
on paranoia at T2, the interaction between change in span of
control and self-monitoring is significant. The model in total
explains a R2 of 0.37. The corresponding Figure 2 shows, as
expected, that changes in span of control affect high and low
self-monitors differently. Specifically, simple slopes analysis (at
±1 SD of the moderator) reveal that low self-monitors experience
a drop in paranoia with increases in span of control (B=−0.082,
SE = 0.033, t = −2.47, p = 0.014, ll-CI(95%) = −0.147, ul-
CI(95%) = 0.017), reversely suggesting that losing span of control
can prompt paranoid cognitions. In line with Hypothesis 2, high
self-monitors are not affected by changes in span of control
(B = 0.069, SE = 0.038, t = 1.81, p = 0.071, ll-CI(95%) = −0.006,
ul-CI(95%) = 0.144).
DISCUSSION
The present study is one of the few that, as called for
(Spain et al., 2014), empirically links clinical psychological
research—as established in standard diagnostic instruments
such as the World Health Organization’s (1993) ICD-10 or
the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV (2000)—with
applied organizational research. Specifically, the present study
is the first to explore the role of paranoia as an antecedent
and outcome of span of control (see Kramer, 2001, for a
broader account of organizational paranoia). In doing so, the
present study significantly adds to previous studies that have
explored psychopathologies as antecedents of getting ahead in
organizations (Judge et al., 2009; O’Boyle et al., 2012). By
additionally confirming an interference interaction with self-
monitoring, a first step in elucidating the underlying process
was taken (Spencer et al., 2005; Jacoby and Sassenberg, 2011).
In particular, the nature of the interaction suggests that the
active ‘ingredient’ to get ahead may be similar in paranoia
and self-monitoring and, given the conceptualization of both
constructs, likely revolves around the proposed mechanism of
social sensemaking and adaptability.
As a further contribution, the present study is also among the
first to submit that changes in span of control will have an effect
on the individuals who attain them. The significant interaction
with self-monitoring again suggests that social sense-making may
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TABLE 3 | Regression model to explain change in paranoid cognitions (paranoid cognitions at T2 controlled for paranoid cognitions at T1) by change in
span of control from T1 to T2 in a linear interaction with self-monitoring.
B SE (robust) t p ll-CI ul-CI
Constant 0.669 0.009 7.51 0.000 0.494 0.844
Paranoid cognitions T1 0.599 0.055 10.9 0.000 0.491 0.707
Change in Span of Control from T1 to T2 (CSC) −0.049 0.029 −1.7 0.089 −0.105 0.008
Self-Monitoring T1 (SM) −0.006 0.026 −0.24 0.809 −0.058 0.045
Interaction (CSC∗SM) 0.075 0.024 3.12 0.002 0.028 0.123
N = 441, lower (ll) and upper level (ul) for Confidence Intervals (CI) at 95%, R2 = 0.37.
FIGURE 2 | The interactive effects of changes in span of control and
self-monitoring on changes in paranoid cognitions.
lie at the heart of the process. As such, the present research also
opens a discourse about how certain dispositions are malleable
in the face of situational factors – a discourse that has been
called for in applied psychology (Zaccaro, 2007) and rests on
developments in fundamental personality psychology (Mischel
and Shoda, 1995; Fleeson, 2001; Mischel, 2004; Hudson et al.,
2012).
While the effect sizes of both interactions are not large, an
important point to realize here is that it is that interaction effects
are often underestimated in survey research (McClelland and
Judd, 1993; Aguinis, 1995). As Evans (1985) points out as a result
of his Monte Carlo analysis, interactions with as little as 1%
variance accounted for should be taken seriously.
Applied Implications
From a practical perspective, it is interesting to consider both, an
individual’s paranoid cognitions as an a) antecedent and as a b)
consequence of promotions (and demotions) in organization.
(a) As put forward in the paper’s introduction, the reasoning
for why paranoia and self-monitoring can compensate for the
lack of the other in explaining increases in span of control is
that both concepts come with a heightened social sensitivity
and adaptivity (“social chameleon”). This is beneficial in
organizational politics not only to position oneself for positions of
leadership but also to stay clear of issues that can potentially hurt
one’s career (cf. Bolino and Turnley, 2003, who argue similarily
with respect to impression management that different paths may
be taken; Kramer, 2001). A hasty reaction to the present results
might be that organizations should rid themselves of respective
‘pathological,’ i.e., paranoid, elements before they manage to rise
to the top. However, such actions might throw out the baby
with the bathwater. Indeed, many psychological anomalies are
adequate psychological responses at a certain place and time,
yet inappropriate at a different place and time (Dickinson and
Eva, 2006). This is also the case for paranoid delusions (Maher,
1988; Green et al., 2011; Marr et al., 2012). Indeed, for paranoid
delusions, today’s organizations might be the right place and time.
The self-monitoring literature, for instance, suggests that
the social skills of high self-monitors also help them become
effective (Day and Schleicher, 2006). Day et al. (2002), for
instance, find in their meta-analysis a corrected r of 0.10 with
performance. Kilduff et al. (2001) even argue that high self-
monitors not only emerge as leaders but are also more effective
than low self-monitors because of their ability to manage social
networks. Interestingly for the context of the present study,
researchers present a similar effectiveness argument for paranoid
individuals. Take the already above introduced quote from
Kramer and Gavrieli (2004, pp. 251–252), for instance, that “In
acute sensemaking predicaments, where the costs of misguided
action may be catastrophic to a leader, more effortful and
mindful modes of information processing may be enormously
useful. Thus, precisely because leaders are so willing to allocate
cognitive resources to sensemaking tasks, they might be more
likely to detect early and formulate response to threats that
others underestimate or overlook.” Similarly, popular writers
such as Collins and Hansen in their recent book “Great by
choice” (2011) go beyond the social sense-making and adaptivity
argument and propose that paranoid individuals are often great
leaders because they permanently ask “what if ” questions. Their
analysis mirrors the attitude of former Intel President and CEO
Grove (1997) who, by his own account, constantly worried about
screwed-up products, products getting introduced prematurely,
underperformance of factories or having too many factories,
hiring the right people, whether morale slacks off, and about
competitors that will figure out a better and cheaper way to
deliver what Intel delivers. Such paranoid cognitions, Collins and
Hansen (2011) argue, are particularly valuable in an increasingly
uncertain world where economic crises, global competition,
technological disruption and all kinds of other threats represent
the rule rather than the exception. Those who are paranoid are
often better prepared to meet these challenges. In that sense,
it seems being paranoid could be the essence of adaptivity and
thus pivotal to success (cf. evolutionary accounts: Darwin, 1859;
Haselton and Nettle, 2006).
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Hence, for now, I would hold off with practical advice until
further research is conducted that investigates whether and under
what circumstances paranoid delusions also have an effect on
leadership effectiveness. Such future findings may mirror the
more positive takes on paranoia as those described above, or
they may unearth unwanted collaterals of paranoid leaders, such
as a trickled-down anxiety among their employees, a general
avoidance focus at the expense of any approach tendencies, or
structuring of work relationships according to theory X (instead
of theory Y) because then they seem more controllable. In any
case, further research is needed before the results of the present
study truly fall into place with regard to their specific implications
for practice.
(b) Regarding paranoid cognitions as a consequence: It seems
that the self-entrapping character of paranoia—as Kramer (2001,
p. 24) put it, “Once in doubt, always in doubt”— might not always
hold. As the data show while paranoid cognitions may be fueled
by demotions, they can also be interrupted by increases in span
of control. Notably, this effect is absent for high self-monitors,
which suggests that the social sense-making capabilities inherent
in these individuals provide them with some resilience against
the ups-and-downs of organizations. Thus, it seems, high self-
monitors are not only likely to emerge as leaders organizations
(Day et al., 2002)., they also seem well equipped to deal with the
uncertain consequences.
Limitations and Research Perspectives
Naturally, the present paper is not without limitations. First,
although the present study was conducted as part of a larger
clinical psychological study in the general population, the
recruited sample only involved people who still managed to work
(see sample description). More severe forms of paranoia often do
not allow people to even go outside of their home, and, indeed,
maybe they would also not fill out surveys online for fear of
identification. Thus, the results of the present study should only
be interpreted within the boundaries of non-clinical paranoia.
Indeed, it may be interesting to investigate when paranoid
cognitions loose their adaptive function for individuals and
become burdensome pathologies that impair social cohesion and
performance (cf. Baysinger et al., 2014; Spain et al., 2014). Such
designs may be explored in clinical samples where distortions
in social sense-making may be modeled against the severity of
experienced paranoid cognitions.
Second, getting ahead was measured via the proxy of changes
in afforded span of control. While promotions and demotions
with regard to personnel responsibility are straight-forward
to assess and leave little room for ambiguity or self-serving
biases, the concept of getting ahead in organizations is arguably
much broader. Future investigations may thus turn to additional
criteria of career success such as number of promotions (e.g.,
Kilduff and Day, 1994) or compensation packages (e.g., O’Reilly
et al., 2013) to see how robust the current findings are.
Third, it seems worthwhile to explore further boundary
conditions. While the present analysis was able to rule out
moderators such as organization size and several demographics,
the literature on organizational politics, for instance, suggests
that aspects such as centralization, formalization, advancement
opportunities, job autonomy, and feedback may also play a
role for those that dance on the social parquet of organizations
(Ferris and Kacmar, 1992; Kacmar, 1999; Blickle et al., 2012).
Investigating environments where paranoid individuals as well as
high self-monitors may strive versus falter seems an important
further stepping stone for understanding the dynamics of social
sensitivity and adaptivity at work.
Fourth and related to the above, while there is much
communality between the business world in Germany and other
countries, results of the Global Leadership and Organizational
Behavior Effectiveness program (Brodbeck et al., 2002) assert
that Germany’s corporate culture can be described as low on
compassion, high on performance paired with a high power
distance. It may be that this environment uniquely caters to
paranoid individuals to get ahead but also reduces paranoia
once people are promoted. Low power distance cultures with
higher accountability toward all sides may, for instance, show
reverse effects that paranoia increases the higher one is promoted
in the hierarchy. The identified effects thus await intercultural
confirmation.
CONCLUSION
The popularity of recent studies with a psychopathological view
on people at the top (e.g., Kets de Vries, 1994, 2003, 2012; Babiak
and Hare, 2007; Collins and Hansen, 2011; Dutton, 2012) are an
indication of our fascination with psychological disorders that
enable people to get ahead in organizations. To some extent
such popularity signals that the experiences of the wider public
resonate with these investigations. As suggested in books such
as “Snakes in Suits” (Babiak and Hare, 2007) or “A First-rate
Madness: Uncovering the Links between Leadership and Mental
Illness” (Ghaemi, 2011), it seems personality defects can be quite
adaptive in certain environments. Or as former Intel President
and CEO Grove (1997) put it more succinctly: “Only the paranoid
survive.”
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